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Abstract—Mobile payment system in a disaster area have the
potential to provide electronic transactions for people purchasing
recovery goods like foodstuffs, clothes, and medicine. Conversely,
to enable transactions in a disaster area, current payment
systems need communication infrastructures (such as wired
networks and cellular networks) which may be ruined during
such disasters as large-scale earthquakes and flooding and thus
cannot be depended on in a disaster area. In this paper, we
introduce a new mobile payment system utilizing infrastructure-
less MANETs to enable transactions that permit users to shop in
disaster areas. Specifically, we introduce an endorsement-based
mechanism to provide payment guarantees for a customer-to-
merchant transaction and a multilevel endorsement mechanism
with a lightweight scheme based on Bloom filter and Merkle
tree to reduce communication overheads. Our mobile payment
system achieves secure transaction by adopting various schemes
such as location-based mutual monitoring scheme and blind
signature, while our newly introduce event chain mechanism
prevents double spending attacks. As validated by simulations,
the proposed mobile payment system is useful in a disaster area,
achieving high transaction completion ratio, 65% - 90% for all
scenario tested, and is storage-efficient for mobile devices with
an overall average of 7MB merchant message size.
Index Terms—Mobile payment system, endorsement, delega-
tion, MANETs, bitcoin
I. INTRODUCTION
L arge scale disasters have a major and lasting social andeconomic impact on people, causing damage that leads
to loss of human life, materials and massive economic loss.
One of such impact is leaving people in a disaster area
without cash-at-hand to purchase necessities like foodstuffs,
clothes, and medicine. Although real cash is considered to be
the easiest means for carrying out a transaction, it may be
impossible to get cash in a disaster situation since access to
a bank is restricted both physically (roads may be blocked
or the bank destroyed) and electronically (communication
infrastructures, like wired networks and cellular networks, may
fail due to an earthquake or flooding). Furthermore, existing
payment systems require such communication infrastructures
for transactions in a disaster area. To enable people to do
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transactions even in a disaster area, therefore, of vital impor-
tance to people in disaster areas is an infrastructureless mobile
payment system which can utilize flexible and robust mobile
adhoc networks (MANETs) formed via the widely used smart
mobile devices (smart phones, etc.).
Furthermore, several payment systems are developed to
provide electronic currency services, but none has been specif-
ically created to solve the payment challenges faced by the
people in a disaster area (see Section II for related work). The
proposed system is also capable of providing such services,
however, since there is no access to the bank in a disaster
area, the use of electronic currency for online transaction is
restricted. Therefore, our secure payment system is centered
on enabling offline transactions utilizing MANETs. In de-
signing such a MANET-based payment system, the following
challenges [2] should be considered: (1) Frequent network
disconnection - One of the characteristic of MANET is low-
power supply, this can impede a constant connection between
users. (2) Persistent change in topology - Topology changes
quickly in MANET as a result of node’s mobility in the
network. Thereby leading to a decrease in performance. (3)
Inadequate security - Secure characteristics of wireless net-
works are lacking in MANETs; this increases the flaws of
MANETs to attacks.
In this paper, we propose a mobile payment system that
utilizes self-organized MANETs to enable people to carry out
a transaction in disaster areas. The main contributions are
summarized as follows.
• First, we propose a new mobile payment system to allow
electronic commerce in disaster areas, in a situation
where the bank is not accessible.
• Secondly, we introduce an endorsement-based scheme to
provide a merchant payment guarantees for a customer
using multilevel-endorser scheme to sufficiently cover
transaction amount.
• We introduce a transaction-log-checking scheme (called
event chain) to prevent double spending attack before
a transaction is completed. In addition, we propose an
electronic money scheme (called e-coin) for account
balance checking and to prevent a predetermined number
of parties (Nc) from colluding.
• We also adopt a light-weight scheme, based on techniques
of Bloom filter and Merkle tree, to reduce communication
overheads.
• Additionally, we introduce a mutual tracking mechanism
that can proof that transaction are valid and reliable.
• A digitally signed photo is proposed for authentication
and to restrict an attacker from carrying out a fraudulent
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transaction and impersonating others.
• Furthermore, we adopt a blind signature technique to
protect user’s privacy by ensuring that each user uses
different temporary IDs in every transaction.
• Finally, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
secure payment system by simulation to test the usability
in disaster areas. Our simulation focused on: the ratio
of successful transaction completions, merchant com-
munication overhead, the validity ratio of event chain,
the size of an event chain and the effect of various
parameters such as endorser density, mobility speed of
nodes and density of monitoring nodes on the transaction
completion ratio. Our simulation results showed that the
transaction completion ratio increased significantly by an
average of 48%, 28% and 22% using 100, 200 and 500
mobile nodes, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces related work on mobile payment systems. In
Section III we present preliminaries concerning payment
system participants, authentication, user registration, etc. We
introduce our proposed secure payment system in Section IV
and evaluate the proposed system in Section V. Section VI
concludes the whole paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several studies have been carried out on mobile payment
systems which, however, require the support of communi-
cation infrastructures to enable secure transactions and are
therefore unsuitable for disaster areas without communication
infrastructures. Li et al. [3] introduce an electronic payment
mechanism that permits a payment transaction between a
vehicle and a merchant when there is a limited connection,
however, this mechanism needs a constant link from the
merchant to the bank to complete the transaction, and can-
not be used, therefore, to provide the needed services for
people in a disaster area. Dai et al. [4] proposed an offline
payment mechanism, that is used to buy digital goods. Their
proposed mobile payment system adopts mechanisms from
Dai’s previous works, which introduced a debit-based payment
protocol. Patil et al. [5] introduced an offline electronic
coupon micro-payment system. Their scheme is based on
credit and allows users to delegate their ability to pay for an
item to another person device. The electronic coupon scheme
delegation protocol is based on multi-seed payword chains.
Their scheme focuses on minimizing the computational cost
of mobile devices with limited resources. Similarly, Chen et al.
[6] proposed a scheme that focuses on e-payment systems with
electronic cash. To reduce a merchant’s burden of having an
account for depositing electronic cash received from customers
with multiple banks. Chen’s scheme introduced the concept
of deposit delegation, which allows a merchant to maintain
a single account at its trading bank: the system delegates
all deposits from various banks into that account. Kiran et
al. [7] introduced a payment system that uses a public-key
and a cryptographic hash function to provide security for the
transaction. In addition, the proposed payment system uses
chains of delegates in which a customer can delegate the
authorization to transfer money from the customer’s account
to other clients (to a vendor, for example). The system allows
clients to carry out transactions both on-line and off-line.
Hu et al. [8], for example, proposed an online micro-
payment system where a customer can purchase goods from
the merchant. To do this, a customer need to first send to
the merchant a purchase request together with the payment
authorization. In addition, the identity of users is confirmed
indirectly, hence, customer’s privacy is protected. However, the
protocol can only handle one payment at a time, and relies on
a trusted third party, which sometimes hinder the performance
of the system. Wang et al. [9] introduced an electronic cash
payment system which reduces the computational overhead
of transactions. The computational cost reduction is achieved
by integrating the trapdoor hash function into the system.
Wang’s payment system requires only integer multiplication
and addition operations for computation, similar to [10], [11].
Chang et al. [12] focuses on an e-payment system by
introducing a novel electronic check scheme to address the
inflexibility of the electronic check proposed in [13], [14].
The scheme adopts cryptographic techniques such as a one-
way hash function, a blind signature and RSA cryptosystems
to protect the system against attacks. The scheme allows a
customer to attach the cost of goods to be purchased and
the merchant information to the electronic check during a
transaction, thereby achieving mutual authentication by the
customer and the merchant. Liaw et al. [15] also adopted
a similar concept to Chang’s electronic check mechanism to
introduce an electronic traveler check scheme that is capable
of handling an offline/online transaction. However, Liaw’s
scheme, unlike Chang’s electronic check, adopts a one-way
hash function which improves performance and reduces the
cost of the system. The customer ID is added to the traveler’s
check to prevent impersonation of the customer by other users.
Dahlberg et al. [16] survey several existing mobile payment
systems and suggests the basis for evaluating the mobile
payment study. Furthermore, concerning several gray areas,
they propose solutions on which, they suggest, future mobile
payment research should be centered.
Nakamoto [17] introduced a distributed e-cash system
known as Bitcoin that does not depend on a central authority.
In the system, a new transaction is transmitted to the entire
network, and each node receives the transaction into a block.
Then each node attempts to perform a reverse calculation of
a hash function as proof-of-work to verify the transaction in
their blocks. (The verification procedure is called mining, and
each miner are compensated for each block verified). This
calculation takes a large amount of computation. Nodes receive
a block only if the transactions are genuine and if the Bitcoin
has not been used in the previous transaction. The hash of a
received block is used in the next block to form a block chain,
and with this, all users can agree on the sequence in which
transactions occurred. However, Bitcoin requires a device with
high power, and transactions are computationally irreversible,
so that Bitcoins can never be replaced if a user’s private key
is forgotten or destroyed.
This paper differs from related work in the following points:
We introduce a secure payment system that utilizes infrastruc-
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tureless mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) to permit users
to buy recovery goods in disaster areas. Also, we propose a
mechanism that ensures that double spending will be detected
before a transaction is completed, unlike existing systems that
detect double spending only when e-coins are deposited in a
bank or deducted from a customer’s account. Our proposed
system uses an approach comparable to that of Bitcoin in
that transactions are stored in the block chain. However, our
method differs in its techniques, since users in our system
do not need proof of work. Rather, users calculate the hash
value of a transaction log, and neighboring nodes append their
signatures to the log to form an event chain (similar to a
block chain). The event chain can be verified by surrounding
neighboring nodes. Unlike most existing payment systems, our
proposed mechanism does not depend on a central authority
or mint to detect double spending.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce entities involved in our pay-
ment system, user registration and authentication processes,
system assumptions and a purchase example in a common
payment system.
A. Participants
All entities (customer, endorser, merchant, and bank) that
join and are involved in the payment system will be referred
to as users. All users communicate through MANETs.
• Merchant - a user that provides goods.
• Customer - a user that buys goods from a merchant.
• Endorser - a user that agrees in advance to make
payments for the customer, if the customer fails to pay.
• Monitor - a customer that audits every transaction within
the radio range to make sure that each message is valid
and reliable.
• Bank - an organization that maintains users’ accounts.
• Delivery Truck - A truck used for delivering items to
the customer. Also used to pass messages between the
bank and the users (endorsers) in a disaster area every
two days.
B. Proposed System Overview
Our proposed payment system adopts two operation modes:
the first mode is the Internet mode, which functions like every
normal online payment system and it is used when there is
no disaster. The second mode is the MANET mode, which
is used in a disaster situation. When there is a disaster, the
system automatically switches the operation mode from the
internet mode to MANET mode. Since our goal is to allow
people in a disaster area to access essential amenities, we will
focus on the disaster mode of our payment system.
In payment systems, successful transaction completion is
essential, however, this cannot be achieved if there is no
communication between the users, merchant and the bank.
This is the case in a disaster area where the communication
infrastructure may be destroyed and access to the bank is
cut off both physically and electronically. Therefore, the first
aspect of our payment system for the MANET mode is to
establish a means of communication among users in a disaster
area. To achieve this, we adopt infrastructureless MANETs
and DTN- based communication (the communication process
is explained later in Section III-F.
Then, the next aspect is to establish a means of identifying
users and confirming if there is enough account balance to
pay for an item since there is no direct connection to the bank
during transaction. Therefore, we introduced various schemes
such as digitally signed photo and e-coin to achieve this.
Also, it is impossible to get physical cash, which a customer
needs to pay for the item being purchased since access to
the bank is restricted due to destruction of bank infrastructure
and communication. Hence, a customer cannot make a direct
transaction with the merchant. Detailed implementation of
these schemes is explained later.
C. Registration
To join the system, customers and merchants register with
the bank before a disaster occurs. Each user generates its
public and private key pair, then sends only the public key
to the bank. The bank is the only trusted party among all
the entities involved in the payment system, hence, acts as a
certification authority and set the key expiration which can be
as long as specified by the bank. Introducing a separate third
party to carry out this function will introduce a bottleneck in
the system as all users will need to communicate with this
third party and since the bank is not available in the disaster
area, thereby introducing more overhead in the system. Hence,
paying the merchant for a transaction will be difficult. The
private key is kept secret by each user. The notations for a
user’s public and private keys are shown as follows: User’s
Identity - Bank (B), Merchant (M ), Customer (C); Public
Key - Bank (KB), Merchant (KM ), Customer (KC); Private
Key - Bank (K−1
B
), Merchant (K−1
M
), Customer (K−1
C
) and
Digital Signature - Bank (S
K
−1
B
), Merchant (S
K
−1
M
), Customer
(S
K
−1
C
).
The registration process in our system can be divided into
three stages: merchant registration, customer registration and
endorser selection. This registration process takes place before
disaster happens.
1) Merchant registration:
A merchant submits a registration request to the bank to
join the mobile payment system. Then the bank accepts the
registration request and generates public and private keys for
the merchant.
2) Customer registration:
A customer submits a registration request to the bank to
participate in the mobile payment system. Then the bank ac-
cepts the registration request and generates public and private
keys for the customer. The customer selects a photograph and
requests the bank to sign the photograph with the bank’s digital
signature. The bank signs the customer photograph with the
bank’s digital signature.
3) Endorser selection:
The customer submits the list of users that will serve as
his/her endorsers in the system before disaster occurs (this
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endorsers are only used for MANET mode transaction). If a
user agrees to endorse other specific users, the user deposits
real money in the bank. Since there is no direct connection to
the bank (both electronically and physically) in a disaster area,
the deposited money need to be converted to electronic coins
which is used in a disaster area to confirm if an endorser has
sufficient money to endorse other user’s transaction when the
purchase of an item is initiated. The bank generates electronic
coins equivalent to the amount deposited by the user (now as
endorser).
D. Providing Authentication and Security
In an online payment transaction, the customer identity is
verified real-time via the bank, and access to the payment
system is allowed providing the verification is successful. A
customer cannot be impersonated without an attacker knowing
the customer’s information. In a disaster area, verifying a
customer’s identity is currently difficult as a direct link to
the bank is not accessible, as a result of the lack of a
communication infrastructure.
In our system, each customer chooses a photo that will
be digitally signed by the bank, which is used to verify
a customer’s identity during a transaction and protects the
customer when an attacker stole their phone. (Which is similar
to checking an individual photo on an ID card, moreover, in
our system the merchant will also check the digital signatures
of the bank and the customer which is on the photo.). Another
form of biometrics authentication mechanism may also be
used.
To further secure transactions, each message is digitally
signed and encrypted. Thus achieving non-repudiation of
transactions. In addition, a monitor can audit every transaction
and thus detects an attacker in the network.
E. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about our mobile
payment system.
• Fewer than a predetermined number of parties (Nc)
collude to commit fraud.
• Users are identified by digitally-signed pictures.
• Most of the users do not power off phones very often.
This is to discourage users from deliberately switching
off their phones in order to carry out an attack.
• Most of the phones owned by legitimate users do not
share similar location histories, as their Global Position-
ing System (GPS) coordinates are error bound with a 4.9
- 10 meter range of each other.
• Node density is sufficient in most of the locations.
• Users can use GPS in almost every location, i.e., we adopt
the use of normal GPS for accessing users GPS position
since the A-GPS and other positioning technologies used
to improve GPS accuracy cannot be accessed due to the
destruction of cell towers when disaster happens.
• An attacker is not quick enough to get the needed
information from the system before the event chain is
invalidated (a scheme explained later).
• A user can access a bank using the DTN-based commu-
nication formed via the delivery truck at least every two
days.
F. Communication Model
In a disaster area, a delay/disruption tolerant network (DTN)
[18] can be used in addition to a MANET formed among user
nodes. The DTN communication can be achieved when two
nodes in close proximity to each other communicate. Using
the store-carry-and-forward technique, a node stores a message
temporarily and forwards the message when the node comes
across another node. For the DTN in a disaster area, our
approach uses smart phones of users and the delivery truck
to form such a network.
Our Network Model: Since there is no direct communica-
tion to the bank as a result of the destruction of the existing
communication infrastructure and users in a disaster area are
characterized by limited resources (such as bandwidth), it takes
several days for users messages to get to the bank. We assume
that customers and endorsers are in close proximity to a mer-
chant. Therefore, we adopt a network with a communication
range of 100m between the users in a disaster area (that is,
customers, endorsers and merchant). A minimum of six (6)
nodes (i.e. one customer, one endorser, three monitors and a
merchant) are required to complete a transaction successfully
and the 6 nodes are present within this communication range.
When a user sends a message to the merchant, the message is
store-and-carry-forward by the intermediate node between the
customer and the merchant. In addition to a MANET formed,
we introduced DTN-based data dissemination and collection
via the delivery truck to transmit messages to/from the bank
for the users and the merchant. Each delivery truck moves from
the nearby reservoir and cover regions one after the other. The
delivery truck is used to deliver items to the merchant in the
core disaster area from the nearby reservoir and data moves
with this truck. Therefore, with the DTN formed, multi-hop
data transfer is possible and communication formed by the
truck to the bank in a non-affected area is established.
G. Payment System in Areas without Disaster
In areas that are not affected by a disaster, the customer and
merchant can connect directly to the bank using the wired or
wireless networks. The steps to purchase an item in such a
payment system is illustrated below:
1) The customer broadcasts a transaction order to purchase
an item from the merchant, (for example, an apple that
costs $20).
2) The merchant verifies the customer’s identity and for-
wards the billing message to the bank, (for example,
customer C requests to purchase an apple that costs $20).
3) The bank confirms the customer’s account balance and
accepts the transaction if the balance is enough to
cover the cost of the transaction. Then withdraw the
equivalent cost from the customer’s account and inform
the merchant to supply the item. However, if the account
balance is not enough, the bank rejects the transaction.
4) The merchant delivers the item to the customer.
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5) The transaction amount is paid to the merchant, then
the bank sends transaction completion notification to the
customer.
This approach will be unsuccessful in a disaster area due to
the following reasons:
1) Inaccessible communication infrastructures.
2) Inaccessibility of a bank.
3) Fraudulent Transactions and Impersonation.
4) Security/Authentication Issues — Real-time verifica-
tion of user’s identity is impossible in disaster areas due
to the lack of a communication infrastructure.
To provide a solution to these problems and ensure that
there is a payment system that can function in a disaster area,
we propose a secure payment system based on endorsement
and adopt various mechanisms to secure the proposed system.
IV. SECURE MOBILE PAYMENT SYSTEM BASED ON
ENDORSEMENT
In this section, we first introduce the concept of endorse-
ment and then give detailed explanation of our secure payment
system for disaster areas. Our system provides payment guar-
antees to the merchant in a disaster area where there are no
network infrastructures nor direct access to a bank.
A. Endorsement
In our system, an endorsement is a mechanism by which the
endorser agrees in advance to make payments for the customer,
if the customer fails to pay. For this, the endorser should
have real money deposited in a bank beforehand. An endorser
agrees to serve directly as a customer’s endorser by signing an
endorsement agreement, thereby personally guaranteeing the
customer’s transaction and pledging to make payment for up
to the amount deposited by the endorser for every transaction
in which the customer defaults in payment. The endorsement
agreement comes with the two conditions that (1) the real
money deposited in the endorsement account will be restricted
(locked) to endorsing a customer (the locking of the account
is effected when the mode of our system is switched from the
Internet mode to MANET mode) and (2) the amount endorsed
for any transaction has a limit. The endorsement agreement is
made during registration prior to a disaster.
In the proposed method, a minimum of one endorser can
successfully endorse a transaction as long as that endorser
can cover the payment for the transaction amount. However,
to avoid a situation where the endorser is not able to pay
for the transaction amount which would lead to a shortage of
money to pay the merchant. Therefore, we allow a customer
to have multiple endorsers to guarantee each transaction so
that the endorsement liability for one transaction is shared
among all endorsers. In this way, the risk of endorsing is
reduced if a customer purchases an item, but then defaults.
To motivate endorsers to cooperate and support the mobile
payment system, some part of the transaction amount (e.g.,
3%) is shared among the endorsers as incentives. The percent-
age of the transaction amount to be used for the incentives is
agreed between the bank and the merchant when the merchant
joins the mobile payment system. In addition, we introduce
multilevel endorsement where an endorser delegates its en-
dorsement capabilities to its own endorser. Each user indicates
if they want to participate in such multilevel endorsement at
registration, which is before disaster happens. In the multilevel
endorsement, when an endorser inherits a transaction from
users it normally endorsed, it does so using the exact same
endorsement amount agreed to for such user. For example, if
user A is an endorser to user B, and user B is an endorser
to user C. Using the multilevel endorsement when user A
inherit the user C’s transaction, for the endorsement to be
completed, user A needs to sign its signature to show its
intention to guarantee the transaction. User A uses the actual
endorsement amount that is agreed for endorsing user B to
endorse user A. In the multilevel endorsement, each user
inheriting a transaction still needs to append its signature on
each endorsement. Any transaction without endorsement (i.e.
there are no primary endorsers or secondary endorsers) is
rejected by the merchant.
1) Starting transaction after disaster:
Once a disaster occurs, a customer and a merchant in
close proximity agree to begin a transaction; the users and
the merchant meet to establish a connection by exchanging
IDs and pictures. The customer sends his/her photograph
to the merchant for identification. The merchant compares
the photograph with the customer’s actual appearance. The
merchant also confirms the digital signature of the bank on
the photograph. When a customer tries to purchase an item,
the exchanged picture is used to identify a customer. The
merchant verifies the bank digital signature, timestamp and the
customers digital signature on the picture. The same procedure
is used by all users in the network to identify each other.
2) Transaction Process:
Through the endorsement mechanism, we realize a mobile
payment transaction in a disaster area even when there is
no direct access to the bank. For example, let us consider a
scenario where an endorser D decides to endorse customer C.
The minimum node density required to complete a transaction
is six (6) nodes (one customer, one endorser, three monitors
and a merchant). The process for customer C for buying an
item from a merchant using an endorsement mechanism is
illustrated below:
• STEP 1: Customer C broadcasts a transaction order
message to purchase an item from the merchant, (for
example, an apple that cost $20). The transaction order
message contains a transaction order form, customer C’s
temporary ID, the merchant’s ID, the endorser’s ID, the
bank’s ID, the item number, the item quantity, etc.
• STEP 2: The merchant checks customer C’s ID (through
a digitally signed photo) and generates a billing message.
However, since there is no definite process of confirm-
ing customer C account balance, the merchant forwards
the billing and transaction messages to the endorser, to
request that the endorser provides payment security the
transaction.
• STEP 3: The endorser checks the merchant’s ID and
customer C’s ID and generates an endorsement message,
signifying that he/she will provide payment security for
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the transaction by signing the endorsement message with
his/her signature. The endorser sends the endorsement
message, billing message and transaction order message
to the merchant, stating for example, ”I agree to provide
payment security for customer C’s transaction of $20”.
• STEP 4(a): The merchant checks the endorser’s ID and
customer C’s ID and sends all messages to the bank if the
IDs are valid. These messages take two days to reach the
bank as there is no direct communication to the bank as
a result of the destruction of the existing communication
infrastructure. The messages are transmitted from the
merchant to the bank using the multi-hop data transfer
through the bank truck DTN-based data collection.
• STEP 4(b): After sending all the messages to the bank,
the merchant immediately supplies the item to customer
C. The merchant will receive the payment as the trans-
action is endorsed by endorser D.
• STEP 5(a): The bank checks the ID of all users and if
other information provided is genuine. A few days later,
the bank checks the account balance of customer C and
withdraw the transaction amount ($20).
• STEP 5(b): The equivalent amount of $20 is paid to the
account of the merchant.
• STEP 5(c): However, in an instance where customer C’s
account balance is not sufficient to cover the transaction
cost, the transaction amount is taken from endorser D’s
account.
To prevent unfair - exchange, we adopt transaction settle-
ment and dispute settlement process, where the paid trans-
action amount is set aside for a particular period during
which a customer can report a merchant for not delivering the
items purchased. The merchant needs to show proof of item
delivery to the customer (usually customer signature collected
by the merchant when the customer receives the item). If
the merchant fails to do so, the paid amount is refunded
to the customer. Hence the merchant is paid if the proof is
confirmed to be valid or the dispute period elapse without a
customer complaint. The merchant does not need to worry
about a customer not paying if the endorsers has guarantee
the transaction with valid e-coins.
Our approach enables electronic commerce in a disas-
ter area despite the restricted communication access to a
bank. However, we still encounter the challenges presented
in Section III-G. We will discuss solutions for each challenge
successively.
3) Preventing Collusion:
In our mobile payment system, endorsers provide financial
security to pay a merchant on behalf of their customers.
However, since there is no direct connection to the bank
during a transaction, there is a possibility that the endorsers
and a customer to collude to cheat in the payment system. In
addition, there is a possibility that a customer or the endorsers
could draw out money from their accounts before the bank
deducts money for the item. Therefore, a method is required
to check the endorser account balance before the transaction
is completed. We adopt the e-coin technique for the endorsers
account balance confirmation.
To be able to purchase an e-coin, a certain amount of money
needs to be deposited. The deposited money is locked in an
endorsement account, thereby preventing the endorser from
using the money to buy an item (that is, the endorser can
use the money locked only for endorsement). In a situation
where an endorser endorses a transaction and attempts to take
away all the account balance from his/her endorsement account
before the bank confirms the payment, this attempt will fail as
the endorsement account is locked during the disaster mode
of our payment system.
E-coin: The bank generates unique e-coins for an endorser,
identical to the tokens in [19], [20] eT1 , eT2 , eT3 ,... eTn , for
instance, the total amount of the e-coins will be equivalent
to the account balance of the endorser. The e-coin contains
the endorser’s ID, the e-coin ID (signed with the bank digital
signature), the e-coin value, and a predefined expiration date.
The reason the expiration date is attached to an e-coin is to
avoid the endorser losing money from their account if an e-
coin is lost or corrupted while being delivered to the endorser.
The bank sets a pre-determined expiration date on the e-coin.
The e-coin will be invalid after the predetermined date, if the
bank has not received a report from the endorser that the e-coin
was received. In the case of invalidity, the bank then issues a
new e-coin as a replacement for the lost or corrupted one. If
the e-coin is not utilized till it expires, the e-coin turns invalid
and cannot be accepted by a merchant. A monitor can prove
if an e-coin is still valid or not by confirming the expiration
date on the e-coin.
To endorse a transaction, an endorser attaches to an endorse-
ment message, an e-coin equal to the endorsement amount
of the transaction. (The e-coin is part of the endorsement
message, which is signed by the endorser).
In a situation where the endorsed customer pays for the
transaction, the bank will reissue the e-coin to the endorser.
Otherwise, the corresponding amount will be deducted from
the endorser’s account. Thereby, collusion between the cus-
tomer and the endorser is impeded by checking if there is an
e-coin attached to the endorsement message.
When an endorser requests a new e-coin from the bank, the
e-coin is either received directly from the bank or transmitted
to the endorser through the users available within the radio
range. As a result of some communication disruption between
the users and the bank, the e-coin may be lost or corrupted
while being transmitted. Therefore, we adopt the use of the
DTN-based data dissemination and collection via the delivery
truck for delivering e-coins to endorsers in a disaster area. The
bank delivers new e-coins to endorsers every 2 days via truck.
Additionally, multi-hop communication can be used to deliver
e-coins from the truck to endorsers. Apart from delivering e-
coins to the endorsers, the e-coin truck is also used to bring
back to the bank such users’ messages as merchant payment
and refund of e-coins to endorsers for non-default transactions.
Number of Colluding Parties: In our system, there might
be four colluding parties: Customer, Endorser, Merchant and
Monitor. We analyze different possible types of colluding
scenario formed among these parties (e.g. customer and
endorsers, customer and monitor, customer and merchant,
endorsers and monitor etc.) in our system.
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• Two Customers Colluding : A customer acts as if he/she
is an endorser to the other customer.
• Two Endorsers Colluding : Such colluding can only
happen when one endorser falsely acts as a customer
(e.g., has the means of forging the customer credentials)
while the other endorser guarantees the transaction.
• Two Monitors Colluding: This is the same as endorsers
colluding; colluding between two monitors can only
happen one falsely disguise as a customer while the other
disguise as an endorser.
• Two Merchants Colluding : This is conceivable only
when the merchants get access to the customer and the
endorser credentials (e.g., the customer and the endorser
private keys, real IDs, etc.).
• Customer, and Merchant Colluding : The goal of this
type of colluding is to defraud the endorser. In this
colluding, a customer pretends to buy an item, then return
the item to the merchant and share the money with the
merchant. This form of colluding is difficult to detect
as the endorser has genuinely agreed to endorse such
transaction.
• Customer, Endorser and Monitor Colluding : This
type of colluding is possible if the endorser is able to
forge an e-coin or reused e-coins already used in previous
transactions to defraud the merchant. Also, for this to
work the colluding parties needs to have three unique
monitor for the endorser. The merchant confirms if the
e-coin is been double spent and if the event chain is not
broken. Transaction is only allowed if valid e-coins and
event chain are used.
• Merchant and Monitor Colluding : Similar to other
colluding with the monitor, collusion with the monitor
by a merchant is hard if the monitor of the transaction
is not known beforehand. Hence, this can only happen
when there is a limited number of users in the system.
Our proposed mechanism dynamically assigns a monitor
to check if a transaction is valid before appending their
signature on the transaction.
• Colluding with the Merchant : Collusion between
endorsers and a merchant is not possible if there is
no customer. Moreover, it is not possible to forge a
customer’s digital signature, which is needed for every
transaction.
4) Preventing Double Spending:
An endorser may try to spend the same e-coin twice for two
different transactions, thereby double spending the e-coin, (i.e.,
using e-currency twice to pay the same or different people).
To prevent double spending in the system and also to ensure
that the e-coin is secure, a merchant should be able to check
the log for all events in the past associated with the endorser.
To do this, the endorser requests other monitoring nodes to
sign (with their digital signature) his/her transaction log each
time a new event occurs. This will, however, require a lot
of communication overhead, since the monitoring node will
need to go through the endorser’s entire transaction log before
signing. Therefore, we propose an event chain with a light
Fig. 1: Event Chain.
weight scheme as a solution to double spending.
Event Chain: An event chain is a successive application of
a cryptographic hash function on a piece of an event log (called
a block). Instead of sending and signing on the entire log,
the endorser calculates the hash value of the last block, and
sends it to a monitor. The monitor signs on the combination
of hash value, GPS coordinates, timestamp, and a new event
(e.g., spending an e-coin); the monitor then sends the block
back to the endorser. In this way, all past events of the endorser
are recorded to form an event chain (see Figure 1), which
can be verified by any user. An endorser exchanges a hello
message with neighboring monitor nodes periodically to add
a new event to the event chain. In order to prevent colluding of
up to Nc nodes, we require 3Nc +1 unique monitor nodes to
do this operation since the maximum parties that can collude
at a time is three and also, we need to prevent users that
are serving as an endorser to a customer from acting as a
monitor of the same transaction they are endorsing. Hence the
3Nc + 1 unique monitor nodes will reduce the likelihood of
a monitor node from being compromised as other monitors
can verify the same event chain. Using less than 3Nc monitor
nodes may result into the problem identified in [21], where
the two monitor nodes may give conflicting information back
to the merchant (i.e., one monitor node validates the event
chain while the other invalidates the same event chain). If a
predetermined length of time passes after the last event and
before a new event is added to the event chain, the event chain
is invalidated and can no longer be used. In order to ensure
that the e-coin has not been double-spent, a user receives and
checks the event log which is the entire event chain from the
point at which the e-coin was issued by the bank. When a
new e-coin is relayed through multi-hop communication to
an endorser, a relay node could possibly duplicate the e-coin
before sending it to the endorser. By recording all IDs of e-
coins in the event chain, we can prevent the use of a duplicated
e-coin.
Each user keeps the event chain as their transaction log.
When a new event is created, a new block is linked to the
previous event chain, as shown in Figure 1. The previous block
and the entire log of the present transaction event are signed
and forwarded to the monitor. To validate other information
in a block, a user requests the entire log. It is possible a user
may decide to switch off his/her phone deliberately in order
to carry out a reset and recovery attack or to break an event
chain. Here the user backup his/her phone, reset the phone to
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default settings and restore all previous data to buy an item.
When a phone owned by an endorser is switched off,
the event chain is broken as the endorser is not able to
exchange hello messages with neighboring monitor nodes.
Thereby preventing a new event from being added to the event
chain. As a result, the endorser cannot endorse a transaction
immediately after turning the phone on but since we assume
that there are many endorsers available, the transaction can
be guaranteed by other endorsers. The reason we use e-
coins only for endorsement is to allow customers to make
new transactions immediately after turning off and on the
phone since the transaction is guaranteed by his/her endorsers.
An endorser on the other hand, first need to exchange hello
messages with neighboring monitoring nodes that will verify
and update its event chain before such endorser can endorse
a new transaction.
By introducing the event chain we can prevent double
spending during transaction. However, due to the limited
bandwidth of mobile devices in a disaster area, we need to
make our mechanism significantly light weight. To achieve
this, we adopt the bloom filter mechanism.
B. Light Weight Scheme
We adopt a Bloom filter [22] to represent all the spent e-
coins since the beginning time of the event chain. That is to
say, all spent e-coins are mapped into the Bloom filter. Instead
of recording all the IDs of the spent e-coins in the event chain,
only the hash value of the latest Bloom filter is recorded in
the event chain. When a user checks whether a certain e-coin
is double spent, the user receives and checks the Bloom filter.
In the case of a false positive of the Bloom filter, the
corresponding e-coin is regarded as already spent; this coin
cannot be used. In this case, users have to wait until the e-
coin expires and is reissued by the bank. The Bloom filter can
represent a set of a sufficiently large number of coins with
a small amount of data. When 3000 coins are represented in
a Bloom filter with a 1% false positive ratio, the size of the
filter is 4kbytes.
We also incorporate the technique called Merkle Tree [23]
for reducing the size of the transaction block stored in the
event chain which is to be checked by the monitor nodes.
Each transaction block is hashed and the hash values are then
paired together, the resulting paired hash values are further
hashed until a Merkle tree root is formed (see Figure 2). The
Merkle tree root is stored in the event chain, thereby reducing
the size of the event chain. During a transaction, only the
reduced event chain and the Bloom filter need to be checked
by the monitor nodes.
C. Other Schemes for Secure Transaction
In this subsection, we explain briefly various schemes
adopted to secure transactions in our endorsement-based mo-
bile payment system.
1) Location Information-Based Monitoring:
Many phones might be stolen by one party to use those
phones at the same time to attack the system. To prevent col-
lusion using stolen phones, we propose a location information-
Fig. 2: Reducing log size using Markel tree.
based monitoring scheme to achieve confirmation of transac-
tion location. According to this scheme, each endorser will
continuously exchange HELLO messages with monitoring
nodes to prove that the endorser is in a specific location
at a specific time. Other users of the system can audit the
endorser’s transaction location (its coordinates obtained from
the GPS of the endorser’s phone) by checking the endorser’s
log of the event chain or the log from the time when the e-
coin was received. If an endorser fails to exchange HELLO
messages with other users over several time intervals, this
would show that the endorser is no more in close proximity
of the other users or there is loss of connection. Phones that
have similar location histories cannot be used as monitoring
nodes.
In addition, if an attacker wants to use a stolen phone, the
attacker first needs to find a way to access the customer or en-
dorser’s phone which may be protected by a biometric security.
Then the attacker will need to break the 1024 encryption key,
then get the bank digital signature to forge a new digitally
signed picture and the customer digital signatures.
2) Blind Signature:
Monitoring nodes might access another user’s message
before signing it during a transaction, thereby compromising
the user’s anonymity in the system. To prevent this and,
more widely, as part of the scheme for preventing a user
(customer or endorser) from carrying out multiple transactions
using already endorsed transaction order message for reset
and recovery attacks, we utilize the techniques of the event
chain (to prevent users from reusing the same message) and
techniques of the blind signature [24] (to protect anonymity).
D. Chains of Endorsers
It is possible that the number of endorsers accessible is not
sufficient to pay for the transaction amount, or the customer
does not have enough users to serve as his/her endorser, which
would lead to a shortage of money to pay the merchant. To
detect if there is a shortage of money, the e-coin attached to
each endorsement message is checked, this however, would
cause the merchant to reject an endorsement message every
time the e-coin is less than the transaction amount. To prevent
such and to ensure that the customer can purchase an item,
even when all the endorsers are not fully accessible or when
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the endorsement amount are not sufficient to cover the transac-
tion amount, we introduce multilevel endorsement, where each
customer has multiple levels of endorsers. When an endorser
is not available to endorse a transaction, an endorser of the
endorser will be able to endorse such transaction.
According to this method, endorsers have their own en-
dorsers that can inherit transactions to be endorsed. The
primary endorser delegates its endorsement capabilities to the
secondary endorsers the secondary endorsers agree to serve as
a secondary endorser to a customer beforehand (i.e., during
registration, which before disaster happens) and only pays if
the primary endorsers do not have enough money to endorse
the transaction. The secondary endorsers thereby serve as
a proxy to the primary endorsers and are responsible for
paying the merchant in a situation where the customer fails
to pay for a transaction. The merchant can access the list
of the primary and secondary endorsers from the transaction
message sent by the customer. The list is created beforehand
(during registration) to form an endorsement-chains tree and
signed with the bank signature to avoid forgery. The list is
updated when primary and secondary endorsers select their
own endorsers.
Let’s consider a default scenario in which customer C buys
an item for $40 from merchant M, with endorser PD as the
primary endorser and endorser SD as the secondary endorser
for customer C.
Default Scenario 1 :When a customer defaults, the primary
endorser is billed by the bank. The e-coins are collected from
the primary endorser PD and SD, however, the secondary
endorser is only billed if the primary endorser does not have
enough money.
Default Scenario 2 : In a situation when a customer defaults
and the primary endorsers do not have sufficient money to
cover the payment or are not available during transaction, the
secondary endorsers will be charged for the transaction. Let
us consider the same scenario described above, the primary
endorsers (direct endorser to customer C) PD1 , PD2 and
PD3 do not have enough money. In this case, the secondary
endorsers (for example, SD) are charged. Each secondary
endorser is charged according to the amount they agreed to
pay for the endorsement.
The merchant sends the billing message to both the primary
and the secondary endorsers to obtain their signature on
the transaction as a payment guarantee. Unlike our previ-
ous method where the merchant searches for the secondary
endorsers one level after the other if the primary endorsers
are not available, this approach allows the merchant to send
the billing message to the secondary endorsers whether the
primary endorser is available or not, thereby avoiding the
excessive communication needed to search for secondary
endorsers when there are insufficient endorsers to endorse a
transaction. This way merchant overhead is reduced. This will
also ensure that there are more endorsers available to endorse a
transaction. In a situation where customer C fails to pay for the
item purchased, both the primary endorser and the secondary
endorser will pay instead.
V. EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis of the Endorsement-Based Mobile Pay-
ment System
The attacks considered were selected as likely given the
limitations of a disaster area plus other common MANET
security challenges. Other MANET-related attacks will be
considered in future work.
• Impersonation Attack: To prevent impersonation, cus-
tomer C attaches a photograph that is digitally signed by
the bank before the bank encrypts the message. An at-
tacker cannot impersonate Customer C without obtaining
his/her digital signature.
• Colluding Attack: In a situation where an endorser and
a customer collude to cheat in the payment system (e.g.,
a dishonest endorser may endorse a dishonest customer
while neither has money in their accounts). The e-coin
technique is used to confirm the endorsers’ account
balance during the transaction. Endorsers attach to an
endorsement message, an e-coin equal to the endorsed
amount of that transaction.
• Double Spending: Suppose endorser D endorsed cus-
tomer C for a transaction with merchant M1 with an e-
coin (for example, eT3) and then tried to use the same
e-coin to endorse another customer’s transaction withM2.
The monitoring user first checks to see if the event chain
is broken or valid. If valid, then the monitoring user
can hash and sign the event chain. So the event chain
prevents an endorser from double spending an e-coin in
our system.
• Non-Repudiation of Transaction Location Source:
Suppose many phones are stolen by an attacker, collusion
among those phones is possible. Also, a customer or an
endorser current transaction may be carried out from a
different geographical location which differs from the
location of previous transactions, and then repudiate
having made such a transaction. Regarding such cases,
other users of the system can detect if any transaction has
been carried out away from an endorser’s usual location
by monitoring the transaction location. The usual location
is the geographic location where the users phone has been
used for a few days. The endorser’s entire log of the
event chain or the log since an e-coin was received is
compared to the event chain at the end of the previous
HELLO message exchanged by the endorser. This makes
it impossible for an attacker, a customer or an endorser to
carry out a transaction in a location other than the usual
location.
• Reset and Recovery Attack: Suppose a dishonest cus-
tomer buys an item from a merchant, then resets the
phone to the default settings. Then the customer recovers
the backup data and uses the same data to buy an
item from a different merchant. To reuse a message (a
transaction order message or an endorsement message) or
an already endorsed transaction message, the user needs
to change the event chain of all previous transactions
in order to modify the hash values, GPS coordinates
and the timestamp in the previous transaction. The user
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Fig. 3: Map for Simulation.
cannot modify the previous transaction message without
changing the hash values. The merchant or the monitor
will detect that the message has already been used. They
do this by checking the entire event chain to see if the
predefined time has passed before a new event was added
to the event chain.
B. Simulation Configuration
The main objectives of our simulation are to validate (i)
usability of our proposed system in a disaster area, and (ii)
reduction of communication cost in order to provide excellent
service for people in a disaster area.
We conducted our simulation using a customized simulator.
The simulated scenario is implemented to enable nodes to
connect with each other easily within the transmission range,
given that mutual and location monitoring is an important
mechanism in our protocol. Mobile nodes are first evenly
placed in a 3km x 3km area. This is based on an actual map of
the area around Nara Institute of Science and Technology in
Nara, Japan, as shown in Fig 3. The skeleton map represents
the road network there. Each node moves according to the
Random waypoint mobility model [25] at a uniform speed of
1 to 1.4m/s and a pause time of 10 seconds. The route is
based on Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm. In our simulation,
transaction message broadcast time interval was set wherein
during this time, the nodes move according to its mobility
model and actively perform an action depending on their role
at that particular time, (that is, either customer, endorser or
monitor). All nodes have the same buffer size and transmission
range. We assume 802.11g wireless WiFi (802.11g comes with
ad-hoc mode) is used for communication. The summary of the
default values used in our simulation is shown in Table I. The
network bandwidth of our simulation is set to 1 Mbps, and
our message size is set to 5KB.
The following metrics will be measured in our simulation.
C. Transaction Completion Ratio
• Transaction Completion Ratio (TCR): The transaction
completion ratio is defined as follows:
TCR =
No. of successful transactions
No. of transaction messages Rec’d by merchant
We evaluated the transaction completion ratio to determine
the usability of our system in a disaster area. Specifically,
TABLE I: Typical simulation parameters value in a disaster
area
Parameter Value
Propagation Model Unit-disc model
Bandwidth 1 Mbps
Buffer Size 100-500KB
Transmission range 100m
Disaster area map size 3km x 3km
Number of mobile nodes 100–500
Node speed 1 - 1.4m/s
Node pause time 10s
Mobility Model Random Waypoint
Message size 5 KB
Hello Message Size 5 bytes
Hello message Interval 10s
Bloom filter size 256bits
Proportion of endorser to customer 4%
Number of monitoring nodes 3
Transaction amount ($) 2
Endorsement amount ($) 2
Total e-coin per endorser ($) 3000
we considered two scenarios, the first being the single-level
endorsement where transactions are endorsed by primary en-
dorsers only. The second scenario considered is the multilevel
endorsement where transactions are endorsed by primary and
secondary endorsers. All simulated results in the figures below
are the averages from 20 simulation runs (see [26]).
1) Transaction Completion Ratio of Single-level Endorse-
ment: As shown in Figure 4a, the single-level endorsement
achieved an average of 42%, 51% and 43% of transaction
completion ratios for 100, 200 and 500 nodes respectively.
The transaction completion ratio increases as time increases
at the early stage of the simulation and decreases as the
simulation reach a steady stage. This is due to limited number
of endorsers for guaranteeing customers transactions.
2) Transaction Completion Ratio of Multilevel Endorse-
ment: The transaction completion ratio increases significantly
with the multilevel endorsement mechanism, averaging 90%,
80% and 65%, respectively, for the three cases above. The
significant increase is due to having more endorsers for
guaranteeing customers’ transactions. Although the transaction
completion ratio decreases as the number of mobile nodes
increases, the proposed multilevel endorsement achieves better
performance when compared with the single-level endorse-
ment, showing an increase from 22% to 48%. The significant
increase is as a result of having more endorsers to guarantee
customer transactions. We achieved this improved performance
with the introduction of the multilevel endorsement. We can
also observe that the transaction completion ratio increases as
time increases, this is because simulations are in a transient
stage from 0.5 hours to 3.5 hours, and beyond 3.5 hours
simulations reach a steady stage.
D. Communication Overhead
• Merchant message size: The size of the message needed
by the merchant to check the validity of an event chain
and to contact secondary endorsers in a successful trans-
action.
Our goal in introducing the multilevel endorsement is to
increase the transaction completion ratio in our system. How-
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Fig. 4: Simulation results for the network (SLE : Single-Level Endorsement, MLE : Multilevel Endorsement, endorser ratio =
4%, merchant No.= 1 and monitoring node No. = 3).
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Fig. 5: Effect of various parameters on transaction completion ratio (SLE : Single-Level Endorsement).
ever, the merchant should not incur additional communication
overhead when multilevel endorsement is used. Therefore,
we evaluated the merchant communication overhead of our
previous event chain as against the merchant overhead of
our proposed multilevel endorsement. As shown in Figure
4b, when compared to the merchant message size in our
previous multilevel endorsement where merchant searches
for secondary endorsers, one level after the other, there is
a 49%, 52%, 60% decrease in merchant message in our
mobile payment system with our newly proposed multilevel
endorsement for different scenarios with 100, 200 and 500
mobile nodes respectively. In all scenarios, the simulation
results show that the overall merchant message size of our
system is 7MB on average, with an average of 54% decrease
of that of our previous event chain, indicating that our system
with multilevel endorsement is storage-efficient for mobile
devices, which have limited resources in disaster areas.
E. Event Chain Validity
• Validity Ratio of Event Chain (VR): The ratio at which
the event chain is valid in our system, which is computed
with the following formula:
V R = 1−
No. of rejected transaction
No. of rejected endorsement messages
Another metric we measured is the validity ratio of event
chain. In our mechanism, we introduced event chains to
prevent double spending. However, an event chain may be
invalidated if dishonest users in the network double-spend
e-coins, complete a transaction without e-coins or try to
complete a transaction without a monitoring node’s signature;
or, if too many nodes share a similar location history. The
simulation results of the validity ratio of an event chain are
shown in Figure 4c. The results indicate that the validity of an
event chain in our system is very high for different scenarios
with 100, 200 and 500 mobile nodes with an average validity
of 98%, 99% and 99%, respectively, when the proposed
multilevel endorsement mechanism is used. The validity ratio
increases as the number of mobile nodes increases, which is
a result of having more endorsers with valid event chains
and having sufficient monitoring nodes available to monitor
transactions. The slight decrease observed in event chain
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validity from 0.5 hours to 3 hours is due to an insufficient
number of monitoring nodes when the simulation is in a
transient stage.
F. Transaction completion time
• Transaction completion time: The time interval from
the time a customer initiates a transaction to the time the
merchant accepts the transaction and supplies the items.
We also evaluated the transaction completion time of our
system in our simulation. First, we explain each process and
analyze the simulation time. The customer creates a transaction
message, appends its digitally signed picture and its signature
to the message. The average computation time for creating the
transaction message and generating a signature by a customer
is 0.006s. The merchant first verifies the customer information
and signature, then verify the digitally signed picture. If the
event chain is valid, the merchant generates the billing message
and forward it to the endorser, the computational time for this
is 0.07s. Similarly the endorser verifies the merchant signature,
generate the endorsement message and creates a new block
for the event chain with an average computational time of
0.5s. The endorsement message is forwarded to other users
for monitoring, a monitoring node validates the event chain
and append its signature. The average computational time
for monitoring an endorsement message is 0.1s. Finally, the
validated endorsement message is forwarded to the merchant
and the merchant also validate the endorsement message to
avoid collusion between a monitoring node and an endorser,
this takes an average of 0.03s. The advantage of our proposed
system is that the average transaction completion time is 1.2s,
which is the reason for the faster execution of transactions in
our endorsement-based mobile payment system.
G. Event chain size
• Event Chain Size: The event chain size with light weight
mechanism as against the normal event chain size.
We also evaluate by calculation the size of an event chain
scheme when the light-weight mechanism is used. First, we
analyze each component that form a block such as new event,
timestamp, GPS coordinate, signature and hash value and
calculate each components size to get the total size of a block.
Each block contains information of 10 e-coins while an event
chain using 30 blocks stores information of up to 300 e-coins.
Then we calculate the size of event chain. The result shows
that the size of the event chain decreased from 3.6KB to
1.7KB with the light weight mechanism, which shows that
our light weight mechanism brought a 54% reduction in event
chain size. Similarly, the size of the event chain checked
by a monitor decreased from 0.24KB to 0.14KB, with 41%
reduction when the light weight mechanism is applied.
H. Effect of Various Parameters on Transaction Completion
Ratio
To clarify if our system can achieve better performance than
our newly introduced multilevel endorsement mechanism, we
examined other scenarios in our simulation by varying differ-
ent parameters (endorser density, mobility speed of nodes, and
density of monitoring nodes) to check how these parameters
impact the performance of our system when the single-level
endorsement is used.
1) Endorser Density: Figure 5a shows that the endorser’s
density has an impact on the transaction completion ratio.
First, we varied the proportion of endorsers from 2% to
12%. The transaction completion ratio increases as the number
of endorsers increases, confirming the effectiveness of our
multilevel endorsement mechanism. We also observe that there
is a slight decrease in the transaction completion ratio for 500
nodes. This decrease is as a result of an insufficient number
of monitoring nodes in spite of there being more endorsers in
the system, e.g., 40 endorsers, giving an endorser proportion
of 8%.
2) Mobility Speed of Nodes: Since the contact times of
nodes are essential for a successful transaction, we evaluate
the impact of a node’s mobility speed on the transaction
completion ratio. The result is shown in Figure 5b with
almost constant transaction completion ratios. According to
this result, a node’s mobility speed has no significant effect
on the transaction completion ratio while the mobility speed
increases.
3) Density of Monitoring Nodes: As shown in Figure 5c,
the transaction completion ratio decreases when the number
of monitoring nodes needed to complete a transaction suc-
cessfully increases. The highest transaction completion ratio
achieved is found when the monitoring node proportion is
set to 4%. This confirmed the effectiveness of our proposed
system setting, i.e., 3 monitoring nodes for validating each
message to avoid collusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new mobile payment sys-
tem which utilizes infrastructureless mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs) to enable users to buy recovery goods in a disaster
area. According to the endorsement mechanism, endorsers pro-
vide absolute payment security for every transaction between
a customer and a merchant, therefore permitting mobile trans-
actions in disaster areas even without direct access to the bank.
Moreover, by adopting various schemes like the Bloom filter,
the blind signature, the event chain, plus location information-
based monitoring, the proposed mobile payment system is
capable of providing secure transactions, while preventing a
fraudulent transaction, collusion, reset and recovery attacks,
impersonation of users, double spending. The system also
reduces merchant overhead and transaction completion time.
Simulations confirmed that our endorsement based mo-
bile payment system is useful in disaster areas. Specifically,
we evaluated the transaction completion ratio, the merchant
communication overhead, the validity ratio of event chain,
transaction completion time, and the event-chain size of our
system. The multilevel endorsement mechanism in our mobile
payment system achieved a better transaction completion ratio,
showing an increase of 22% to 48% when compared with
single-level endorsement. Also, the results show that our
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system is storage-efficient for mobile devices with limited
resources in disaster areas, with an overall average merchant
message size of 7MB for all network scenarios tested, which
is an average decrease of 54% compared to our previous
mobile payment system. Also, the validity of the event chain
mechanism is significantly higher, with an average of 98% -
99% for all network scenarios.
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